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Introduction 
In Chapter 15 of Leviathan Hobbes subjects his Third Law of 
Nature, 'That men perform their covenants made,"1 to an important test. 
If Hobbes can not defeat the Foole, who "...questioneth whether 
injustice...may not sometimes stand with that reason, which declareth to 
every man his own good...,"2 the project of Leviathan will fail. For, the 
Foole, in challenging the Third Law of Nature, challenges Hobbcs's 
contention that society can be viewed as the product of a rationally 
motivated contract between individuals. If the Third Law is invalid, 
contracts will not be kept, and not being kept, will not be entered into. 
Meeting the Foole's challenge is thus of critical importance to Hobbes, as 
well as those with similar contractarian projects. 
This essay will be an examination of three attempts to defeat the 
Foole. In Section 1 I present the Foole's challenge. Section 2 contains an 
examination of Hobbes's attempt to meet the challenge along with 
Gauthier's critique of that attempt. Section 3 details Gauthicr's reply to the 
Foole. Section 4 details Macintosh's critique of Gauthier. Finally, Section 
5 critically examines Macintosh's preferred reply to the Foole. 
Section 1: The Foole's Challenge 
Hobbes argues that individuals in the State of Nature will rationally 
choose to form a commonwealth and appoint a sovereign. Each 
individual, facing the state of war, finds it to be in their own interest to 
participate in such an agreement. However, that same self-interest would 
seemingly lead them to violate the agreement when to do so is to their 
advantage. The tension evident here is nicely modelled by the Prisoners' 
Dilemma. 
Suppose that hobbesian individuals are attempting to decide 
whether or not to keep the state of war-ending agreement or violate it. It is 
plausible to suppose that such individuals will most prefer (based on 
considerations of self-interest) taking advantage of their fellows with 
impunity; will prefer second a state of peace which places equal restraints 
1 Hobbes, Thmas. Leviathan, . (B. Macpherson, ed.) Harmonds Worth: 
Pcnguim Books, 1978, p.203. 
2 Hobbes, Thmas. Leviathan, . (B. Macpherson, ed.) Harmonds Worth: 
Pcnguim Books, 1978,, p.204. 
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on all; will prefer third the continued state of war; and will least prefer 
abiding by the agreement-imposed constraints and being taken 
advantage of by one not so constrained. If we focus on two such 
individuals, we can capture the situation and the stated preferences in the 
matrix: 
Keep Agreement Violate Agreement 
Keep Agreement (2,2) (4,1) 
Violate Agreement (1,4) (3,3) 
(figure 1) 
Although the Foole does not formulate his/her challenge in the 
vocabulary of rational choice theory, we can use the Prisoners' Dilemma 
(hereafter "PD") to illustrate its force. To do this, we need to consider a 
special instance of the PD. 
The PD illustrated in figure 1 tacitly assumed that the players 
would choose simultaneously, but this need not be the case. Suppose, 
instead, that row chooses first followed by column. Such a situation can be 
depicted like this: 
keep • 
K 
violate 
• 
• 
keep (2,2) 
violate (4,1) 
keep (1,4) 
C violate (3,3) 
(figure 2) 
Suppose that row has chosen "keep". What should column do? The Foole 
challenges Hobbcs to prove that choosing "keep" is the rational choice for 
column in such a situation as this. It is not obvious that "keep" is the 
rational choice. Row, knowing column's preferences cannot help believing 
that if she chooses "keep", column will choose "violate", hence, she will 
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choose "violate" at the outset. This forces column to choose "violate" in 
self-defense and thus the players arrive at the outcome (3,3)—the point of 
non-agreement. (A similar argument demonstrates the rationality of 
choosing "violate" in the simultaneous move PD.) If row had reason to 
believe that if she chose "keep" column would choose "keep", the Third 
Law of Nature would be proven valid. 
That this is the challenge as Hobbes perceives it is indicated 
when he writes, 
But either where one of the parties has performed 
already, or where there is a power to make him perform; 
there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, 
against the benefit of the other to perform or not. 3 
Hobbes concludes the preceding thought with: "And I say it is not against 
reason." It remains to be seen whether or not he is correct in this claim. 
Section 2: Hobbes and Gauthier 
Hobbes responds to the Foole in paragraph 5, Chapter 15 of Leviathan. 
Briefly he argues: 
(1) Individuals act to preserve themselves. 
(2) In the State of War the lives of individuals are 
endangered. 
(3) Only the having of confederates and the formation of 
confederacies make survival possible in the State of War. 
(4) Violators of agreements will not be allowed into 
confederacies and will be denied confederates. 
(5) Therefore, those who violate agreements are not acting to 
preserve themselves. 
(6) But such an action violates our initial assumption (1). 
In terms of the game depicted in figure 2, Hobbes is arguing that 
individuals will look beyond its immediate boundaries. Instead of 
deciding between "keep" and "violate", hobbesian individuals also 
examine what effect their choice will have on other situations and, 
ultimately, on their chances of survival. Faced with expulsion from or 
denial of entry into confederacies, individuals will not have the 
preferences ascribed to them in figure 2. Instead, the situation will look 
like this: 
3 Hobbes, Thmas. Leviathan, . (B. Macpherson, ed.) Harmonds Worth: 
Penguim Books, 1978,, p.204. 
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keep • 
K 
violate 
C violate (3,3) 
(figure 3) 
In this situation row need have no qualms about choosing "keep" for if she 
does, she knows that column will also choose "keep": given his preferences 
he has no incentive to choose "violate". Thus, hobbesian individuals can 
reach the agreement necessary to establish the commonwealth; and 
moreover will have no incentive to violate agreements once there is a 
commonwealth. The presence of the sovereign guarantees that any 
violation of an agreement will be subject to punishments which will 
generate in individuals the same preferences as those generated by fear of 
the State of War.4 We can use figure 3, then, to express the situation of 
hobbesians both within the commonwealth and outside the 
commonwealth. 
• keep (1,1) 
violate (4,2) 
keep (2,4) 
4 Although this reading of Hobbes provides an answer to the Foole, it is 
not without attendant difficulties. If individuals are rational enough to 
follow this line of reasoning, it might be argued that they need no 
sovereign to watch over them. Moreover, one might justifiably ask if 
rational individuals, in a state of nature, will move inexorably to a state of 
war (for, being rational, will they not be able to maintain a peaceful state of 
nature?). I think that these are points that need to be addressed, however 
space does not permit their discussion here. For a discussion of the 
problem of defining human nature such that we are sufficiently irrational 
to end up in a state of war and to require a sovereign to extricate us from it; 
and that we are rational enough to reach a state of war ending agreement, 
see Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Jean Hampton. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
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Let us be sure we understand the moves made by Hobbes: 
(1) when individuals are outside the commonwealth (i.e. in the 
State of War), fear of destruction leads to the keeping of 
agreements; and 
(2) when individuals are in a commonwealth fear of the sovereign 
leads to the keeping of agreements. 
Hobbes, then, "solves" the sequential PD by arguing that individuals will 
view their choices in the PD within a broader context, from which 
perspective they will come to modify the dilemma-generating preferences 
of the PD. 
Gauthicr's critique of Hobbes (Chapter 6, Morals By Agreement^) 
has two threads. First, he denies that there will be compliance without the 
coercion exercised by the State of War and the Sovereign. Second, he 
argues that a solution resting on a sovereign is not the best solution. I will 
consider each in turn. 
Gauthicr's presentation of the first thread is worth quoting at 
length: 
But for Hobbes to take full advantage of this response to 
the Foole, he must revise his conception of rationality, 
breaking the direct connection between reason and 
benefit with which he began his reply. Hobbes needs to 
say that it is rational to perform one's covenant even 
when performance is not directly to one's benefit, 
provided that it is to one's benefit to be disposed to 
perform. But this he never says. And as long as the 
Foole is allowed to relate reason directly to benefit in 
performance, rather than to benefit in the dispositions to 
perform, he can escape refutation .6 
Take note of three points made by Gauthicr in this passage: 
(1) Hobbes directly connects reason and benefit, 
(2) Hobbes needs to give a disposition based answer to the Foole, 
(3) Hobbes fails to argue that it is rational to perform a covenant 
when it is the result of a rationally chosen disposition. 
5 Morals By Agreement, David Gauthier. Oxford,: Oxford University Press 
1986. 
6 Gauthier, p. 162. 
1% AUSLECUNG 
Cauthier notes that Hobbes's reply depends on the State of War 
and the sovereign; that it is fear of these two entities which lead individuals 
to have the preferences ascribed to them in figure 3. Thus, if either of 
these entities is removed covenants will not be kept. For, individuals will 
remain self-interested in such a situation and thus have the preferences 
ascribed to them in figure 2, with the net result that no covenants will be 
kept or entered into. 
One immediate response to this point asks why we should be 
concerned that covenant keeping is the result of some form of coercion. 
As long as covenants are kept, why is it important what motivation for 
doing so individuals have? Asking this question brings out two points in 
Gauthier's thought. First, it directs our attention to an important 
assumption undcrgirding his project. Second, it introduces the second 
thread of his critique of Hobbes, to wit, why a sovereign based solution to 
the compliance problem is not optimal. Let us first consider the 
assumption made by Cauthier. 
Gauthier's reading of Hobbes emerges slowly in Chapter 6; in fact 
the best indication of how he views Hobbes does not come until after he 
has finished his overt discussion in sections 1.2 and 1.3. The best 
indication occurs in section 2.1 where Gauthier tacitly identifies Hobbes 
with a form of straightforward maximizer. (The Foole is also a sort of 
straightforward maximizer, hence Hobbes's ultimate inability to defeat 
him.) In contrasting the straightforward maximizer (hereafter "SM") and 
the constrained maximizer (hereafter "CM"), Cauthier gives us a clear 
indication of what he takes to be wrong with Hobbes's reply to the Foole. 
The revealing passage is this: 
...constrained maximization is not straightforward 
maximization in its most effective disguise. The 
constrained maximizer is not merely the person who, 
taking a longer view than her fellows, serves her overall 
interest by sacrificing the immediate benefits of ignoring 
joint strategies and violating co-operative arrangements 
in order to obtain the long-run benefits of being trusted 
by others. Such a person exhibits no real constraint. 
The constrained maximizer does not reason more 
effectively about how to maximize her utility, but reasons 
in a different way. (Emphasis added.)? 
This passage contains a fair appraisal of Hobbes's reply to the Foole. It is a 
form of straightforward maximization. The difference between Hobbes 
7 Gauthier, pp. 169-170. 
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and the Foole is merely one of degree: the hobbesian has a broader 
outlook than does the Foole. The Foole looks only at a particular 
agreement or situation; the hobbesian at the bearing that cooperation in a 
given situation has on survival. The sovereign and State of War are 
effective devices for making individuals take the broad rather than narrow 
perspective of situations. Gauthier does not, however, consider this a 
solution to the Foolc's challenge. 
The key to understanding Gauthier is contained in the bold-faced 
sentence: "such a person exhibits no real constraint." It is this sentence 
which reveals an undcrgirding assumption about what counts as constraint 
in Gauthier's thought. What Hobbes does, in modern terms, is to argue 
that individuals' preferences are different when a sovereign or State of 
War is present than when neither is present. Utility maximization leads, 
when both arc present to the keeping of agreements, and when both arc 
absent, to their violation. Gauthier rejects this reasoning as a solution 
because it docs not make room for constraint. From Gauthicr's 
perspective, the need for such a requirement is easy to see. Morality has 
traditionally been seen as a constraint on the activities of individuals, and 
if morality is to be a part of rationality, rationality must lead to adoption of 
such constraints. Hobbes never asks individuals to constrain the pursuit 
of their preferences while Gauthier argues that there must be constraint if 
the actions they perform are to count as moral. Hobbcsians, who arc 
coerced into cooperation by fear of the sovereign or state of war, are not 
exhibiting constraint and are thus not acting morally. Examining what 
Gauthier means by "constraint" will occupy much of our attention in 
Section 3. 
By itself, this point does not constitute a sufficient reason for 
rejecting Hobbes's reply to the Foole. Hobbes need only dispute 
Gauthier's identification of morality and constraint to save his argument. 
Further, he might contend that his individuals do exhibit constraint, at 
least insofar as they would prefer not to keep agreements but do so 
anyway. Lastly, Hobbes might argue that to ask what individuals would do 
were there no sovereign or state of war makes no sense. Given human 
nature, there will always be a state of war and a need for a sovereign. 
What Gauthier has not yet done is to indicate how Hobbes's response is 
internally flawed. 
I think that Gauthier docs indicate a failure point in Hobbes's 
response to the Foole. Gauthier argues that the sovereign's existence 
requires a maintenance cost and thus the sovereign solution is sub-
optimal: all would do better were they able to keep agreements without 
paying the sovereign.® If individuals are rational, they will not enter into 
R Let us not forget that for Hobbes "paying" the sovereign means giving 
up almost all rights. 
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sub-optimal agreements; hence no sovereign will be appointed. The 
argument here is not that a sovereign will fail to compel the keeping of 
agreements, rather it is that no sovereign will be appointed.^ Gauthier's 
position is that it is possible to reach and keep agreements where no 
sovereign is present. 
I would like to see Cauthier make a stronger case against 
Hobbes. The preceding argument assumes that individuals will not enter 
into sub-optimal agreements, but this will be true only where optimal 
agreements are possible; Hobbes might well argue that no better 
agreement than one creating a sovereign is possible for individuals in the 
What 1 do not find in Cauthier is an argument proving that a non-
disposition based solution will fail. Such an argument might go something 
like this. Individuals who do not have fixed dispositions to comply with 
made agreements are not to be trusted. Even if there is a sovereign in 
residence, individuals will still, at bottom, prefer to violate agreements and 
will do so whenever they believe that they can get away with it. 1 may, then, 
fear that you believe you can get away with violating our agreement, to 
which the rational response on my part would be to not enter into the 
agreement in the first place. 
We might extend this argument to include the sovereign-
generating agreement. In Hobbes's vision of the social contract, all turn 
over all powers (save self-defense) to the sovereign. How can anyone be 
sure, without some sort of disposition which prevents it, that someone will 
not renege on this agreement? If this fear becomes pervasive enough, 
there will be no social contract. 
This is, of course, a mere sketch of an argument. I include it to 
show one argument Cauthier might make against any reply to the Foole 
which is not disposition-based. Gauthier might not embrace this 
argument, but he needs to provide one to prove that non-disposition 
based replies to the Foole will fail. Otherwise, Hobbes has it open to him to 
deny the assumptions about constraint, morality, the nature of individuals 
and the situation in which individuals find themselves upon which 
Gauthier's rejection of Hobbes depends.!0 
9 Cauthier does not himself make this argument. He docs claim that the 
sovereign solution is sub-optimal. The use of the argument to indicate a 
problem with Hobbes's solution is my own. 
10 I am indebted to Dr. A. Cudd for pointing out both the need for such an 
argument and one way one might make such an argument. She might not, 
of course, endorse the argument as 1 have formulated it. 
THE RESURGENCE OF THE FOOLE 199 
Section 3: Gauthier 
I have already introduced Gauthier's idea of constrained maximization. 
To defeat the Foole (a straightforward maximizer) Gauthier must prove 
that rational individuals will choose to become constrained maximizcrs. 
This means proving two propositions: 
(1) that individuals will choose to base their actions on a joint 
strategy when they expect others to and to act on an individual strategy 
when they expect others to.l 1 
(2) that individuals will choose at one time on principles of utility 
maximization to forego further choices by that standard and will instead 
act from a disposition of constrained maximization.! 2 
Both conditions are important and each must be looked at carefully. 
Condition (1) is the more discussed by Gauthier 1^ but condition (2) might 
be even more important. Gauthier's method is to compare the expected 
utility of disposing oneself to maximize utility given other's expected 
strategy choices with the utility of disposing oneself to co-operate with 
others in bringing about nearly fair and optimal outcomcs.14 
At first glance the case for choosing to dispose oneself to act as a 
straightforward maximizer seems strong. We can use a familiar matrix to 
examine the choice: 
CM SM 
CM ( U " , U M ) ( U , U W ) 
SM ( U ^ U ) (U*,U*) 
(Where: U»**>U*'>>U*>U) 
(figure 5)15 
One might reason as follows. No matter what column chooses, row docs 
better by choosing SM than by choosing CM (for U***>U** and U*>U). A 
similar argument can be made for column. SM thus dominates CM and 
11 Gauthier, p.167. 
12 Gauthier, p.158. 
13 See section 2.2 of Chapter 6 of Morals By Agreement. 
14 Gauthier, p. 171. 
15 This formulation of Gauthier's argument is from Campbell's "Moral 
Justification and Freedom", /. of Philosophy, Volume 84 (April 1988): 192-
213. Sec also his "Gauthier's Theory of Morals By Agreement", 
Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 38 (No 152): 343-364. 
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will be chosen as the disposition to form by rational agents. Gauthier 
rejects this argument. 
Gauthier writes, 
...this argument would be valid only if the probability of 
other's acting co-operatively were, as the argument 
assumes, independent of one's own disposition. And this 
is not the case. Since persons disposed to co-operation 
only act co-operatively with those whom they suppose to 
be similarly disposed, a straightforward maximizcr does 
not have the opportunities to benefit which present 
themselves to the constrained maximizer.16 
Cauthier here argues that the reasoning supporting the rationality of 
choosing SM is flawed owing to its failure to appreciate the true nature of 
the CM disposition. Because of this failure, the outcomes represented in 
figure 5 are incorrect. 
The CM disposition, we noted earlier, is one which: 
(a) leads to cooperation with other CMcrs, and 
(b) leads to non-cooperation with SMers. 
Thus, a more correct matrix would be (using the same payoffs as specified 
for figure 5): 
In this matrix CM weakly dominates SM and is thus the rational choice. 
Given transparency of dispositions, no one will be able to take advantage 
of a constrained maximizcr, and only constrained maximizers will gain the 
benefits of cooperation. 
The reader will note (and Gauthier agrees) that this argument 
goes through only if we assume that the dispositions of all are open to 
inspection. In the real world this hardly seems to be the case. 
Consequently, it is important for Gauthier to establish that CM is the 
rational choice in a world (more like this one) where dispositions are 
translucent. For our purposes, however, we need only concern ourselves 
with the ideal situation where transparency of dispositions holds. 
16 Gauthier, p.172. 
CM 
SM 
CM 
(U*»,U»*) 
(U*,U») 
SM 
(U»,U») 
(U*,U*) 
(figure 6) 
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The second condition adumbrated earlier was that the choice of 
CM or SM be a one time choice; a disposition, once chosen, is not subject 
to alteration. Campbell brings out the importance of this condition 
neatly. 1 7 Suppose that dispositions are transparent but that they can be 
changed. With this supposition in mind, consider a sequential 
representation of the game depicted in figure 5: CM (U" 
CM • SM (U, U w > 
SM 
CM 
SM 
(U" # , U) 
(u*, in 
(figure 7) "* 
Player 1 is attempting to decide between CM and SM. At tl player 2 has 
the disposition of CM, thus leading player 1 to choose CM (the expected 
outcome being (U**,U**)). But, if player 2 can change dispositions, 
supposing player 1 has chosen CM at t l , what is player 2 likely to do at t2? 
Her preferences have not changed by adopting the disposition of CM, so 
preferring U*** to U**, player 2 will choose to change dispositions and take 
advantage of player 1. Player 1, aware of this danger, will not choose the 
disposition of CM. Once more, there is no cooperation. To prevent this 
unravelling of cooperation, Gauthier must argue for the non-altcrability of 
dispositions after they are adopted. 
Gauthier never explicitly makes such an argument. It would, I 
believe, have to be something like the following: 
(1) It is rational to choose a disposition to CM. 
(2) If it is rational to choose a disposition, it is rational to do that 
which is necessary to implement it. 
(3) One only gains the benefits of a disposition to CM if one 
renounces the ability to change dispositions. 
(4) Therefore it is rational to renounce the ability to change 
dispositions. 
17 Sec either of the articles by Campbell listed in note 13. 
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The critical step is (2). If one can accept it, the rest of the argument follows 
quickly. 
This completes our sketch of Gauthier's response to the Foole. 
The reply, we noted rested on two claims: 
(1) It is rational to choose a disposition to CM, and 
(2) It is rational to renounce the ability to change dispositions. 
Both arc needed if the Foole is to be defeated. Both have been 
questioned. 
Section 4: Gauthier Critiqued 
Macintosh presents his critique of Cauthier in two papers: 'Two 
Cauthier's?"18 and "Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality"!9. 1 
cannot here hope to discuss the large number of issues that Macintosh 
raises in these papers. Instead, I will draw attention to what I take to be the 
largest problem he raises for Cauthier. 
We noted earlier that one reason Gauthier rejected Hobbes's 
reply to the Foole was because of its failure to include the notion of 
constraint. Moral actions are moral only to the extent that they are 
constrained actions; only to the extent that individuals act contrary to their 
preferences: 
Our claim is that in certain situations involving 
interaction with others, an individual chooses rationally 
only in so far as he constrains his pursuit of his own 
interest or advantage to conform to principles expressing 
the impartial characteristics of morality.20 
Earlier we looked at a passage which explicitly denied that we pursue such 
constraints on grounds of self-interest. Let us, for the moment, accept that 
moral actions are constrained actions. 
Macintosh wishes to argue for an additional feature of moral 
actions. If moral actions are to be identified with a subset of rational 
actions, then since rational actions, to be rational, must be freely chosen, 
moral actions must be freely chosen: "If people only do something 
because of causally stabilized deterministic dispositions, they have not 
1 8 'Two Cauthiers", Dialogue, Volume 28: 43-61. 
1 9 "Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic 
Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Solution of the Compliance 
Problem", Southern /. of Philosophy, Volume 26: 499-525. 
20 Gauthier, page 4. 
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chosen to co-operate, and so do not act rationally in co-©pcrating."21 Let 
us then accept that moral actions must be freely chosen actions. 
With these two conditions in hand, Macintosh's point can be 
presented in the form of a dilemma (though he himself does not make his 
point this way). 
Ml If the disposition to CM is non-alterable, then the actions 
resulting from it are not freely chosen (note that given such a disposition it 
is impossible to choose certain actions, this is the basis for Gauthicr's 
rejection of the argument which demonstrated the rationality of adopting 
SM over CM). Nor would they be chosen else constraint would have no 
meaning. If moral acts are freely chosen acts, then a non-alterable 
disposition docs not lead to the performance of moral acts. And, not being 
freely chosen acts, the acts cannot be rational. Thus, a non-alterable 
disposition gives rise to irrational acts. It seems that, to avoid this result, 
individuals would not choose to adopt such a disposition, or if they did, 
they would no longer be rational or moral agents. 
12] If the disposition to CM is alterable then one of two things is 
the case: 
(a) preferences must be altered so that cooperation will 
be the rational choice for individuals moving second in the 
sequential PD where the first player has chosen cooperation .22 
Changing preferences, however, has as a consequence the 
abandonment of constraint as a part of morality; or 
(b) if preferences are not altered, the compliance 
problem will remain unsolved. 
Briefly, then, we must choose between giving up freedom and 
giving up constraint as part of morality. Or, must we? 
Gauthier could reject (1) as presented, for he enjoins us to look at 
the rationality of dispositions, not the rationality of actions. Bearing this in 
mind, actions qua emanating from a rational disposition are rational and 
given that individuals freely chose to adopt a disposition, they are free 
actions. Such a disposition, chosen on the basis of utility maximization, is 
not subject to change: we choose on "utility maximizing grounds, not to 
make further choices on those grounds."23 Since our preferences remain 
unchanged (we would still prefer the betrayal payoff), we are constrained 
for, when moving second in the sequential PD, we do not do what wc would 
prefer to do. 
21 Macintosh, "Libertarian", p.509. 
22 This is the test case suggested by Hobbes and the one which we have 
employed throughout this investigation. 
23 Gauthier, page 158. 
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Macintosh and McClcnnen24 argue that this move will not save 
Cauthier. Although Macintosh presents a seemingly wide variety of 
objections to Gauthier's disposition-based solution to the compliance 
problem, they can, 1 believe, be reduced to just one. The chief point of 
contention is the requirement that a disposition be chosen once and for 
always. There are a number of ways to make this point. Here are two: 
If it is expected utility calculated from the ex ante point 
of deliberation over policies-that judges a CM policy to 
be superior to the SM policy, it is also expected utility-
calculated from the ex post point of choice of a course of 
action-that will judge implementation of SM superior to 
implementation of CM.25 
The CM disposition qua standing preference for 
conditional co-operation is thus, at the time of the 
behavior in question, one that it is irrational to have. It is 
thus, then, an irrational disposition, issuing in irrational 
behavior.26 
The sentiment of both authors is the same. If it is appropriate to base 
adoption of a CM disposition on considerations of utility maximization, 
then why is it not appropriate to continue to employ utility maximization? 
If there is some flaw in utility maximization, how can it be useful for 
proving that the adoption of the CM disposition is rational? If there is no 
flaw, how is its discontinuation to be justified? Is Gauthier merely saying 
be a utility maximizer when it is rational to be one and not be one when it is 
not rational to be one? If so, how is he giving meaning to "rational"? 
Macintosh and McClennen have asked a good question, 
certainly one that Gauthier must address. Cauthier could respond by 
arguing that there is nothing wrong with utility maximization. Each time 
the disposition needs to be renewed, the rational individual, for the 
reasons adumbrated earlier, will choose to renew it.27 On this reading 
Cauthier gives up the choosing of a disposition once and for all time, but 
contends instead that each time a choice of dispositions is made, 
individuals will select dispositions of the appropriate type, to wit, a 
disposition to choose as a constrained maximizer. Knowing this, 
24 E. McClennen, "Constrained Maximization and Resolute Choice" in 
The New Social Contract: Essays on Cauthier, eds. Paul, Miller, Paul and 
Ahrens. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 
25 McClennen, p. 105. 
2t> Macintosh, "Libertarian", p.514. 
27 1 am indebted to Dr. A. Cudd for pointing out this response to me. 
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entering into agreement with one another. 
The problem with this response, apart from the fact that we must 
now be transparent to one another in more than our dispositions, is that it 
will not provide a guarantee that agreements will be kept. For, individuals 
will still have the option of changing preferences and even if we are fully 
transparent to one another (i.e. able to observe everyone's reasoning 
process and preferences), one might enter into an agreement and then 
face the possibility that the other person will change dispositions; what 
disposition and preferences they had in the past is no sure guide to those 
they will have in the future. Once again, there is room to doubt that 
agreements will be kept and thus a disincentive to enter into them. 
There is another difficulty in Gauthier's reply to the Foole. Let us 
look at figure 6 once more: 
CM SM 
CM (U'*,U»») (U*,U#) 
SM (U», U*) (U»,U») 
Here CM weakly dominates SM. Are the utilities correct as presented? I 
suggest that they are not. If one chooses CM one must also choose a non-
alterable disposition; such a disposition carries an extreme penalty with it— 
the inability to take advantage of a change in circumstance.28 How much 
of a penalty? If U** is only a bit larger than U*, then appreciation of this 
penalty could lower U** enough so that it was equal to or less than U*. 
Were this to occur, no one would choose a disposition to CM and we would 
once again be left without a solution to the compliance problem. In a 
nutshell, I do not think that Gauthier takes sufficient notice of the impact 
the type of disposition required to be an effective CM will have on the 
preferences of agents faced with a choice between CM and SM. 
Serious questions, then, remain to be addressed by Gauthier. 
Both of the questions I have raised here involve the preferences of 
individuals. Perhaps we must, as Hobbes suggested, change our 
preferences if the Foole's challenge is to be met. Consideration of the 
preferences of individuals is at the heart of Macintosh's reply to the Foole. 
28 The penalty is even more severe if we consider non-transparent 
individuals. For example, imagine being locked into a disposition to co-
operate only to find that the other person is not as you supposed them to 
be. Would one really risk such a trap? It would be much like asking a 
hobbesian to give up their right to self-defense. 
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Scction 5: Macintosh 
Let me say at the outset that I believe that Macintosh points a finger at a 
rewarding approach; I do not, however, believe that his approach, as 
presently formulated, is a viable solution to the compliance problem. 
Macintosh's basic idea is that: 
...we construe the CM disposition as just a set of 
preferences for justice for its own sake, practical act-
rationality then justifying co-operative choices as 
maximizing of utility-of individual preference 
satisfaction-given the new preferences.29 
The basic idea is that individuals will alter their preferences to value 
justice for its own sake: "I say one must revise the overall balance of one's 
preferences so that one prefers, above all else, to have co-operated with 
those who prefer to co-operate with conditional co-operators.''3^ 
In game form: 
CM (1,1) 
(4,2) 
1 
CM (2,4) 
(figure 8) 2 SM (3,3) 
Civen these preferences, it is rational for utility maximizing individuals to 
choose a CM disposition: considerations of justice here play the role for 
Macintosh that the State of War and the sovereign play for Hobbes. 
(Thus the similarity between figures 8 and 3.) 
There arc two aspects of this account which require attention: 
(a) Preference Alteration. In order to preserve the freedom of 
choice individuals are allowed to alter preferences at will. According to 
what rule will they change preferences? That preferences can change 
should alarm the player choosing first in a sequential PD. Knowing that 
preferences can change, will the player moving first adopt a CM 
29 Macintosh, 'Two Cauthiers?", p.53 
30 Macintosh, 'Two Cauthiers?", p55. 
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disposition? I think that Macintosh's emphasis on freedom gets him into 
trouble. If individuals arc too free to change preferences, then there is no 
sure way to know what they will do. Fearing the worst, a prudent first-
mover will choose SM.31 
(b) Constraint. Are we to give up the idea that moral actions 
exhibit constraint? Macintosh has allowed for freedom of choice, but 
since we are acting to maximize our preferences, this account is subject to 
the same criticism raised against Hobbes by Gauthier. Macintosh must 
present cither a case for not viewing constraint as integral to moral acts, or 
explain how his account incorporates constraint. 
Conclusion 
Despite the efforts of Hobbes, Gauthier and Macintosh, the 
Foole's challenge has not been met. If we are ever to defeat the Foole, we 
must try to appreciate why each effort failed. 
Hobbes suggested that individuals would prefer to uphold the 
Third Law of Nature when fearful of the State of War or the Sovereign. 
We argued that this fear was not a sufficient guarantee that agreements 
would be kept; that individuals would, at bottom, prefer to violate 
agreements; and that the fear-generated preferences were ephemeral and 
hence not to be relied upon. One could not know when entering into an 
agreement whether, when it came time to fulfill it, the other party would be 
sufficiently motivated by fear to keep the agreement. Without such 
knowledge, rational individuals will not enter into agreements. 
Gauthier attempted to assure compliance with made agreements 
by arguing that individuals would choose dispositions which would dictate 
the keeping of made agreements. The problem with this approach is that 
Gauthier supposes that while our overall preference is to adopt such a 
disposition, some of the actions it requires (keeping agreements, for 
example) will be contrary to some of our discrete preferences (this allows 
Gauthier to demonstrate that his theory includes constraint). With respect 
to our discrete preferences, we thus behave irrationally. Additionally, for 
the disposition to ensure compliance, it must not be subject to change; 
31 Macintosh might respond that individuals will make probability 
calculations of how likcty it is that free individuals will alter their 
preferences in unfavorable ways. This response will avoid the objection, 
but only if Macintosh can develop an account which demonstrates that 
prudent first movers will not use disaster avoidance reasoning and that 
they will have sufficient faith in their calculations Macintosh will also 
have to provide a formula to act upon them. 
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however, this would seem to imply that we are not free and we noted that 
free choice is a characteristic of rational choice. If we can change our 
dispositions, then we face the same uncertainty in our dealings with others 
that hobbesians face. For, who can be sure that someone's overall 
preference will not fluctuate with the situation they find themselves in? 
(Especially given that our discrete preferences, if acted upon would lead to 
a change of disposition.) Cauthier, to, then, fails to provide a guarantee 
that the Third Law of Nature will be upheld and thus that a social contract 
is possible. 
Macintosh attempted to ensure compliance by arguing that 
individuals would prefer a disposition which once adopted, would alter 
their preferences such that one preferred each and every action dictated 
by that disposition. Since our preference is to keep agreements (because 
the disposition we choose dictates the keeping of agreements), there is 
nothing to fear-agreements will be kept if entered into. The difficulty 
here, we noticed, is that individuals remain free to revise their preferences 
and thus their dispositions. We cannot be sure that someone will not alter 
their preferences and thus their dispositions in the space of time between 
the making of an agreement and its fulfillment. Like the responses of 
Hobbes and Cauthier, Macintosh's leaves room for the Foole to insert 
doubt sufficient to undermine the making of agreements. 
Hobbes, Cauthier and Macintosh recognize that to defeat the 
Foole they must provide a sufficient guarantee that agreements will be 
kept. Hobbes attempts to ground his guarantee in the preferences of 
individuals. Gauthier and Macintosh attempt to ground their guarantees 
in dispositions. The problem is that preferences and dispositions are 
subject to alteration; hence there is no guarantee that agreements will be 
kept. In fact, as the Foole points out, there is every reason to believe that 
they will not be kept. For, if we take as our domain self-interested 
individuals, the factors that lead them to choose to cooperate, will also 
dictate their non-cooperation when it is to their advantage to do so. The 
Foole's challenge thus makes it doubtful that we can view society as the 
product of a rationally motivated contract between individuals; rational 
individuals do not enter into contracts which they do not believe will be 
kept. Unless the Foole's challenge can be met, the prospects for social 
contract theory are dim. Despite 350 years of effort, the Foole continues to 
foil our attempts to meet his challenge-32 
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